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Abstract
Emerging deceptive systems present a new promise for the uprising security problems in
cloud-based virtual networks, especially those operated by small and medium enterprises. The
main goal of deceptive systems is to form a layer of defensive nodes in an Internet-accessible
cloud-based virtual network to distract and deceive malicious clients. While numerous
approaches provide distinct models for developing decisive systems, misery digraphs present
a promising decisive model for distracting powerful remote intrusions. Misery digraphs can
delay access to targets deep in a cloud-based virtual network. A central challenge to the theory
of misery digraphs is verifying their applicability in prominent cloud computing platforms
as well as measuring the efficiency of networks that adapt them. Thus, architectural support
is needed that can be realized with long-term support technologies and can be deployed for
large networks. This work presents and analyzes a high-throughput architecture for misery
digraphs, embarking on implementation details and performance analysis. Full implementation
of the architecture in Amazon Web Services imposes modest performance delays in the request
processing, while highly delaying stealth intrusions in the network.
Keywords: Architecture; cloud security; intrusion prevention; web application security;
web services
1. Introduction
Cloud-based virtual networks enable small and
medium enterprises to rapidly and efficiently
initialize, deploy, maintain, and evolve net-
works of virtual machines. For example, a
startup company can utilize a virtual network
for connecting a user-end client application to
the company’s services by launching virtual
machine instances that could be conveniently
connected to Internet gateways, subject to a
firewall, and access control rules. Prominent
cloud computing platforms such as Amazon
Web Services and Google Compute Engine
provide both programmable interfaces to man-
age virtual machine instances and modify their
access control rules. While solutions have as-
sisted small and medium enterprises in achiev-
ing their rapid growth, security challenges con-
tinue to threaten these networks, causing un-
precedented costs as a result of attacks, which
can lead to disastrous consequences.
Among the many security problems, re-
mote vulnerabilities are of critical importance.
A remote vulnerability in an Internet service
can potentially allow intrusion into hosts that
constitute a network’s surface. These hosts
are connected to the Internet, receive requests
from clients, and communicate them to iso-
lated databases, application servers, and other
services within the network. The intrusion’s
goal is to gain remote execution access on the
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victim host, for example, through opening a re-
mote shell, or by hijacking a vulnerable appli-
cation to divert the execution, ultimately cre-
ating malicious user accounts on the target.
When under control of the intruder, the vic-
tim host in the network’s surface would allow
the attacker to further exploit vulnerabilities
within the network by investigating hosts that
are accessible from the compromised one.
Network deception is a potential solution for
slowing the rapid progress of intrusion in a vir-
tual network. To this extend, in previous work,
the concept of misery digraphs was introduced,
which provided a dynamic structure within a
network of web services, distracting and con-
fusing the attacker who wishes to compromise
a specific target deep in the network [2]. In the
proposed solution, a cloud-based virtual net-
work is modeled as a connectivity digraph rep-
resenting the network’s accessibility structure.
The connectivity digraph is then converted into
an expanded structure of decoy nodes that are
dynamically modified over time, consistently
losing an intruder’s effort towards a target.
Misery digraph is a powerful concept that re-
quires intensive implementation and testing.
The present work investigates an architec-
ture of the misery digraphs that enables a
dynamic network structure within Amazon
Web Services. The architecture includes sev-
eral components that, given an initial network
setup, transform an existing cloud-based vir-
tual network into one that includes misery di-
graphs, implementing a full misery digraph de-
fense system. This requires a careful design
of a transformation process, a realistic imple-
mentation of misery digraphs using a service-
oriented network, and an analysis of the feasi-
bility of the proposed system.
1.1 Problem statement
This work investigates the problem of the
efficient transformation of web services in
cloud-based virtual networks into deceiving
networks containing misery digraphs. The fo-
cus is on networks that are created on Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) with complex struc-
tures containing multiple web servers, appli-
cation servers, and database servers. The as-
sumption is that the web servers, which form
the network’s surface, are vulnerable to remote
attacks, and the attacker does not have prior ac-
cess to servers. The attacker’s target is a criti-
cal asset, such as a database server in the net-
work.
1.2 Approach and results
The approach is to design an architecture
that realizes misery digraphs in AWS. Since
misery digraphs complicate an attack path (by
enlarging the path to the target, adding decoys
that are continuously relocated), the challenge
is to minimize the performance penalty facing
benign network requests. Thus, we designed a
transformation process that aids network man-
agers to implement misery digraphs according
to the specifications in [2]. The transforma-
tion process receives a conventional (and vul-
nerable) virtual network and produces a net-
work of misery digraphs, including the net-
work paths of the original conventional net-
work, while adding decoy paths. Misery di-
graphs evolve and change their structures over
time, increasing the system’s uncertainty for
attackers. This dynamic nature of misery di-
graphs requires a special proxy system for for-
warding network requests from the network’s
entry points towards the target. We developed
the proxy system for misery digraphs based
on Apache’s reverse proxy module. The effi-
ciency of the approach was measured by con-
structing two networks that perform identical
functions, one using misery digraphs as the un-
derlying topology, and one that uses a minimal
connectivity digraph. The results show that
misery digraphs impose a modest performance
penalty when processing HTTP requests when
compared to networks that do not implement
misery digraphs.
2. Background
While no prior work has proposed a practi-
cal and efficient architecture for deceiving sys-
tems for the cloud, the literature includes a
wide spectrum of deception and moving tar-
get defense techniques for combating powerful
network attacks. Some of the earlier pioneer-
ing works in deception focused on the use of
overlay networks as the core idea of deceiv-
ing, distracting, and slowing denial of service
attackers targeting specific hosts within a net-
work. Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [14],
and later WebSOS [18], utilize an overlay
network and enforce strict verification of the
sources of incoming requests when communi-
cating with a host. If a source passed verifica-
tion, a subset of hosts would act as proxies that
forward the traffic towards hidden servers (of-
ten serving applications) within the network.
The proxies are secret, and their identities are
not exposed. The assumption in SOS and Web-
SOS is that both parts of the communication
are known a priori.
Network overlays, the use of proxy servers,
and the assumption of known clients was the
underlying approach for many other related
works. Within this context, Migrating OVEr-
lay (MOVE) [22] was introduced, advocating
the idea of client filtration via authentication,
and used client migration as a policy for main-
taining service availability as well as detecting
abusing clients (also called insiders). MOVE,
similar to others, built on ideas from moving
target defenses [10, 8]. The idea behind MO-
TAG [12] was to provide a hidden contact
point to each legitimate client when the client
is registered and authorized to use the service.
MOTAG uses these hidden contact points (or
proxies) to filter clients and control access to
application servers. Later, address shuffling
and client migration are also used in MOTAG
to bypass attacks. Moving target defenses do
not necessarily aim to deceive attackers, but to
keep attackers in the dark, random port hop-
ping was proposed [6], which distracts denial
of service attackers while using packet filtra-
tion to recognize legitimate traffic. Similar
to randomizing ports, redundant data routing
paths [15, 20] is a technique that can poten-
tially distract attackers.
Defending against denial of service in
clouds has been the subject of some other re-
cent studies. One proposed approach is to use
elastic cloud features to guard against a grow-
ing distributed denial of service attack [13].
Misery digraphs avoid the ever-expanding net-
works due to denial of service vulnerabili-
ties by modifying the existing network of ma-
chines, thus preventing overhead costs.
The idea of deception has also been widely
studied in various other forms, including de-
ceptive attack techniques [21, 16, 4], defense
techniques that use software defined networks
to deceive attackers [11, 1], defending against
non-volumetric distributed denial of service
attacks [19], slowing down network scan-
ners [5], occasional trap-setting to detect il-
legitimate insider activities [7], and as vir-
tualized honeypots atop the production net-
work [23, 9].
2.1 Misery Digraphs
Misery digraphs [2] take a radical approach
and form a the theoretical basis for deception
in cloud-based virtual networks. Similar to at-
tack graphs [10, 17, 3], misery digraphs model
host access control rules in a cloud computing
platform as a digraph. The resulting digraph
is input to an algorithm to enlarge and stretch
every path from an entry point to a target host.
An entry point is a host that is accessible over
the Internet without filtration based on origin’s
IP, while the target is a host that is only acces-
sible through entry points or other hosts that
are accessible through entry points.
The core elements of misery digraphs are:
(1) multiple, identical, and enlarged paths to a
target, and (2) a schedule of resetting and re-
locating hosts on randomly selected paths to
target. For example, a simple path to target,
u1 → u2 → t1
is converted into a digraph consisting of a k-
ary tree, with a single enabled path towards t1,
as depicted in 1.
A cloud-based virtual network implement-
ing misery digraphs would need to replicate
a network request to nodes directly accessible
from an entry point. For example, in Figure 1,
a request R1 received at u1 will be replicated
and sent to u2 and u3, which in turn replicate
R1 to the layer below. The nodes at the final
layer u4, u5, u6, and u7 attempt to forward
u1
u2 u5
u6
u3
u4
u7 t1
Fig. 1. A misery digraph generated for the at-
tack path u1 → u2 → t1, with an embedded
binary tree. An edge ui → uj means ui can di-
rectly access uj via some network protocol. In
reality, u1 is a web server, u2 and u3 are appli-
cation servers, t1 is a database server, and the
rest are reverse proxies.
R1 to t1. Misery digraphs guarantee that R1
will reach t1 through one and only one path
(through t1 → u7 in the example digraph of
Figure 1). The rationale is to confuse the at-
tacker early on in the digraph about the true
path towards the target.
Misery digraphs are also required to main-
tain freshness through a schedule of changes to
the location of nodes. At fixed time intervals, a
controller procedure inside the network selects
two nodes at the same layer (for example, u4
and u6 in Figure 1) and switches their locations
in the digraph. Next, the hosts representing the
nodes are deleted from the network, and two
fresh hosts are created and added in their lo-
cation. The hosts will be created from images
that contain the required software for process-
ing requests.
While simulation is a useful method for as-
sessing the effectiveness of misery digraphs
and similar models, this work attempts to pro-
vide a realizable and practical architecture, ad-
dressing challenges facing system administra-
tors when adapting the model, including chal-
lenges concerning the required implementa-
tion and performance tuning.
3. Architecture
Our design of misery digraphs has two prime
components. The first is a component to im-
plement the continuous evolution of the di-
graph (Figure 2) resulting in a Moving Target
Defense (MTD). The second component im-
plements a deep traversal of the client’s request
through the Misery Digraph Cloud, sending
the response back to the client. This process
follows a multicasting method, as described in
Section 2.1. The focus of the architecture is on
implementing two tasks:
1. Constructing a Misery Digraph Network
using pre-existing cloud architecture and
deploying the constructed network to the
cloud as a set of instances and fire-
wall rules (security groups rules in AWS
terms).
2. Frequently selecting random instances of
Misery Digraph Cloud to switch their par-
ents and children and reset their images.
This process is referred to as the Trans-
formation Process (TP).
Throughout this work, Misery Digraph Net-
work refers to the theoretical representation of
the network as a graph data structure, and Mis-
ery Digraph Cloud refers to the realization of
misery digraphs in the cloud as a set of in-
stances and security groups. Also, a client is
defined as an application that is served by the
Misery Digraph Cloud.
Figure 2 shows the Moving Target Defense
component of our architecture. As a first step,
the administrator builds the architecture of the
cloud and defines firewall rules, then Cloud
Constructor creates a Misery Digraph Net-
work using the same method as in [2], fill-
ing the network with decoys and deploy this
network to the cloud. Once the Misery Di-
graph Cloud is ready, Movement Manager se-
lects two random instances from a layer in the
misery digraph, which only contains sibling
nodes. The first layer and the last layer (layer
at depth d + 1, containing the target node)
are excluded from selection by the Movement
Manager. Note that a misery digraph is cre-
ated using two parameters: a branching factor
k, and the number of layers d + 1. Once the
layer is selected, the Transformation Process
is performed at the selected layer. This entire
process of selection and transformation is re-
peated each period of time, t.
Fig. 2. Our architecture includes a cloud con-
structor, which examines the initial topology
of the cloud-based virtual network, expands
it to one with an embedded misery digraph
of decoy nodes with a special access control
setting, and automatically deploys the result-
ing topology in the network’s Virtual Private
Cloud (VPC). A movement manager uses a
pool of initialized virtual machines to contin-
uously evolve the resulting network by a sys-
tematic mutation of the misery digraph.
Figure 3 shows the life cycle of client’s re-
quest in the MDG cloud. In our architecture,
the life cycle of a request starts by receiving
it in an entry point node. Compared to nor-
mal processing of an HTTP request, which is
sent to an application server and finally to a
database server, our architecture modifies this
path by multicasting the request to a layer of
decoy nodes. This multicasting continues un-
til it reaches a Request Server instance from
which a database request is created. The re-
quests are cached in a database registry, await-
ing responses from the database server. Once
the response is received, it is propagated back
up the tree until it reaches the entry point.
The entry point instance is the only instance
of Misery Digraph Cloud that is publicly ac-
cessible. A client sends a request to the en-
try point, which runs the Misery Multicaster
that multicasts the requests received from par-
ent nodes in the previous layer to all children
in the next layer. Once the request reaches
layer d, a request to the target is stored by the
Requests Server. The RS will then wait for
the PS to ask about the request. The Polling
Server runs on the target itself and connects to
Requests Servers on layer d to query them if
there is any new request for the database. If
so, the requests will be processed, and the re-
sponse will be sent to the Requests Servers. A
response travels backward (in the opposite di-
rection of the leaves) until it reaches the client
through the entry point.
Isolated Target refers to disallowing any in-
stance of layer d to reach the target, letting the
target to poll the requests instead. This is one
of the differences from what is presented in the
original work [2].
Receive HTTP request 
Send the request down the tree
Check the Polling Server
Checking with 
target serverCheck the Polling Server
Multicasting 
Multicast request 
to an immediate 
layer of nodes 
below the 
current node
Awaiting 
Response
Cache the 
request, forward 
it, and wait for 
the response.
Updating the 
cache registry
Update Request Server
Multicasting 
the response Multicase response backwards
Fig. 3. Life cycle of a client’s request in the
Misery Digraph Cloud.
The presented architecture is intended for
testing on Amazon Web Services (AWS). De-
spite this, the main ideas are applicable to
competitors because the architecture was de-
signed to be generic with the least dependency
on the underlying technology specific to AWS.
Throughout this work, references are made to
AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instances,
which are virtual machines that are computa-
tionally independent and are created using pro-
gramming tools available to cloud users. A
cloud refers to an account on a cloud comput-
ing platform containing a virtual network of
EC2 instances.
3.1 Cloud constructor
In order to construct the Misery Digraph
Cloud, the cloud the administrator should set
the preferred values of the parameters d and
k, the parameter d + 1 represents the num-
ber of the misery Digraph Network’s layers,
while k represents the number of children for
each node in the graph that belongs to layer
1, . . . , d. After setting the parameters d and k,
the Cloud Constructor uses the Amazon Web
Services Application Programming Interface
(API) to retrieve the current architecture of the
cloud, including the instance information and
security groups. In our architecture we defined
a tag named instance type with the value mdg
for each instance the administrator would like
to use in constructing Misery Digraph Cloud.
Cloud Constructor identifies those instances
and their security groups and leaves other in-
stances.
By analyzing the rules of security groups,
the enabled services in the current cloud are
identified (e.g., web server, FTP server, SSH,
etc.). The Constructor creates connectivity di-
graphs for each available service. A con-
nectivity digraph represents the firewall rules
that enable communications amongst two con-
nected instances. Thus, an edge (u, v) entails
that network communication is enabled from
instance u to instance v. Based on the cre-
ated connectivity digraphs, a misery digraph
will be created for each service. In this step
of creating misery digraphs, the network will
be filled with decoys depending on the values
of the parameters d and k. Once all misery di-
graphs of each service are constructed, a union
operation will be performed on them to get the
final misery digraph. The final misery digraph
is referred to as the Misery Digraph Network.
At this stage, Constructor deploys Misery Di-
graph Network to the cloud. Depending on
the edges of Misery Digraph Network, security
groups and their rules will be created to facili-
tate routing network requests across decoy ma-
chines in the network. As the new digraph re-
quires redundant decoy nodes, the correspond-
ing EC2 instances will be created, resulting in
a Misery Digraph Cloud.
To enhance the performance, the operat-
ing system images of misery Digraph Cloud
should be ready and stored as Amazon Ma-
chine Images (AMIs) in the AWS cloud. Three
types of images should be available: (1) A
Misery Multicaster image which will run the
entry point and all instances of all layers but
layer d (the layer right before the target) and
d + 1 (target’s layer). (2) Isolated Target Re-
quests Server image, which runs the layer d,
web application (that is, an application that
connects to the target service) should reside in
this image. (3) Isolated Target Polling Server
image, which runs the target (layer d + 1), the
database server (which is the attacker’s target
according to our assumption) resides in this
image.
3.2 Evolving misery digraphs
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.1, a mis-
ery digraph prevents an intrusion from reach-
ing a target machine by (1) continuously inter-
changing two nodes, and (2) deleting and re-
placing a node with a new node. The goal be-
hind these two properties of misery digraphs
is to lose the effort of an attacker on an attack
path towards the target. The Transformation
Process of our architecture implements these
two features. When creating new instances,
the TP faces a challenge: AWS approximately
requires five minutes of effort to create a reg-
ular EC2 instance. Since the Transformation
Process involves replacing a running instance
with a fresh instance, the five minutes delay
causes a bottleneck. To mitigate the delays
in creating instances, the Movement Manager
(Figure 3) maintains an instances pool. The
Movement Manager creates a set of s instances
in the instances pool for future use. Depend-
ing on s and the number of running instances
and their image types, the Movement Manager
computes the minimum number of instances
needed in the pool while taking into consid-
eration that creating a new instance during the
reset process should occur as infrequently as
possible. After initializing the instances pool,
two random instances will be selected, at a
layer a of the misery digraph, from a random
layer but target and entry point’s layers. In
other words, the entry point and the target in-
stances shall not be selected. The Transforma-
u2 u3
u4
u5
u6
u9
u10
u11
u12
u7
u8
u15u16
u13
u14
Fig. 4. In this network, the nodes u5 and u8
are randomly selected and switched such that
in the new resulting network, u8’s parent is u3,
while u5’s parent is u4.
tion Process performs two functions:
• Switching ensures the disconnection of
the attacker’s session, which connects
him to a compromised instance from
layer a + 1. This compromised instance
parent is also one of the selected in-
stances. When this process is performed,
the changes will be committed on both
Misery Digraph Cloud in Misery Digraph
Network, this process is implemented by
switching the parents and children of the
two selected instances. Technically, the
security groups of the two instances will
be switched. Figure 4 shows an example
of the switching process. The network in
this figure is a part of a complete MDG
network. In (A), both u5 and u8 were se-
lected for the switching process. In (B),
the switching was performed, as we can
see the parent and the children of u5 and
u8 were swapped.
• Resetting replaces those two selected in-
stances with other pool instances that
have the same image. It ensures that
the other instances of the Misery Digraph
Cloud can communicate these new in-
stances. A new pool instance will be cre-
ated for each consumed instance pool in
u0 u1u2
RQ1
RQ1
RP1 (2 ms)
RP2 (3 ms)
Fig. 5. When sending the request RQ1 to de-
coys u1 and u2, the Multicaster awaits for the
fastest response, RP1 in this case, and discards
the slower ones.
the process with the same image type. An
instance will be created on-demand on the
case where no pool instance of the image
is available. After finishing this process,
the replaced instance will be terminated.
This process helps when the attacker has
installed a backdoor or turned the instance
to a bot.
3.3 Multicasting requests
Misery Digraph requires an instance to mul-
ticast any request to the whole instances in the
next layer. It ensures the integrity of the mes-
sage and hides the true path to the target. The
Misery Multicaster is a reverse proxy server
with multiple targets instead of just one target.
Misery Multicaster runs the entry point and all
instances but layer d instances and the target.
The first step of a client’s communica-
tion starts with the misery Multicaster. We
have implemented this component by using
an open-source project MapProxy, which uses
the Tornado network framework. As shown
in Figure 5, when a new request is received
by Misery Multicaster, the same request is re-
transmitted to the instances of the next layer.
Let ep be the entry point, which resides in the
first layer and u1 and u2 be the instances of
layer 2. In this case any new request will be
sent to both u1 and u2 by ep. Subsequently,
ep is going to wait for the response. Once
the fastest instance sends the response back to
the ep, the response will be sent directly to the
client. The response of the slower instance(s)
will be discarded. The same method is used
with a larger number of instances in the next
layer of Misery Multicaster instance.
3.4 Design of Isolated Target
The idea of Isolated Target is to isolate the
target from any external or internal connec-
tions. Thus, no entity can connect to the tar-
get using any port. While Misery Multicas-
ter is concerned with the client’s HTTP re-
quest, Isolated Target addresses the web ap-
plication’s request to the database. As men-
tioned earlier, the Isolated Target consists of
two components: (1) Requests Server (RS) and
(2) Polling Server (PS). The details of both
components will be examined in the next sub-
section.
3.4.1 Requests Server and Polling Server
In our design, the web application interacts
with the the database server as the Requests
Server. We developed the Requests Server as
a MySQL server that runs on port 3306 in our
setup. Note that the Requests Server is not a
real database management system; it only be-
haves as one in the handshaking stage of the
connection with the web application. This is
completed with one goal: to get the request
that should be sent to the real database and
store those requests.
When a client requests a page from the web
application, the request is transmitted through
the network from the entry point by using
the Misery Multicaster. Layer d of the Mis-
ery Digraph Cloud contains instances that run
web servers (e.g., Apache HTTPd). The web
servers process the request according to the
web application’s code. When the code needs
to connect to the database (which is the target),
it connects to the Requests Server instead.
At the beginning of the session between the
web application’s code and Requests Server,
the latter is going to behave as a MySQL server
to get the request of the application (e.g., query
some table). Once the application’s request
is received, it will be assigned with a unique
identifier and then be stored in a location in the
Requests Server. One such location can be the
Requests Server’s memory, but we have cho-
sen to store those requests in the disk by using
the SQLite3 database engine. Up to this point,
the application is waiting for the response from
what it believes is the database server, and the
Requests Server is waiting for Polling Server.
The Polling Server runs on the target itself.
The PS in the same machine the real database
server exists. For each short time interval of
m, Polling Server asks all Requests Servers
of layer d if there is any new request for the
database that has not been handled. If so, those
requests will be consumed by PS and sent to
the real database. Once the response arrives,
it will be sent back to the Requests Server that
issued that request.
3.4.2 Handling dynamic IP addresses
Recall that Misery Digraph Cloud evolves
over time. When two nodes u and v are inter-
changed, Misery Multicaster must update the
IP addresses of u and v in the nodes of the next
layer. Similarly, the Polling Server must be up-
dated with the IP addresses of layer d instances
to be able to query them about new requests.
Thus, there is a need to dynamically and effi-
ciently update IP addresses across the misery
digraph. This dynamic updating is handled by
the Address Server (Figure 6).
Movement ManagerAddress 
Server
Address 
Server
Reset Process
IP Addresses
IP Addresses
Update 
List
Instance in d?
Yes
No
Misery Multicaster
Polling Server
Fig. 6. The communication between Move-
ment Manager and Address Server in both
the Misery Multicaster and the Polling Server.
When the selected instances are in layer d the
Movement Manager communicates both the
Polling Server’s and the Misery Multicaster’s
Address Server. Otherwise, the Movement
Manager only communicates with the Misery
Multicaster’s Address Server.
Figure 6 shows the communication between
the Movement Manager and Address Server
in both the Misery Multicater and the Polling
Server. Initially, when new instances of the
Misery Multicaster and the Polling Server are
started, a list of needed IP addresses will be
stored in a list that will be maintained and
used in the future. AWS APIs are to be used
to initialize this list. When interchanging two
instances on any layer (except layer d), the
Movement Manager connects to the instances’
parent Address Server to update the Misery
Multicaster with the changes. This causes the
misery Multicaster to query AWS API again
to receive the new list of next layer’s IP ad-
dresses. Similarly, when an instance of layer
d is reset. In addition, it tells its parent to up-
date the IP addresses. The Address Server of
the target will then be connected by the Move-
ment Manager, and it will be updated with the
new IP addresses of layer d.
4. Performance
The main goal of this work is to assess the
feasibility of implementing misery digraphs in
real-world networks in terms of the processed
traffic in regular web applications. For this as-
sessment, multiple rounds of tests were per-
formed on a synthetic cloud-based virtual net-
work created using an AWS account. The traf-
fic processed by a normal cloud-based virtual
network is compared with two variations of
misery digraphs. The experiments reveal that
while misery digraphs can incur performance
penalties and request processing failures, the
system’s performance penalties are reasonable
compared to the magnitude of confusion cre-
ated for the attacker.
Experimental Setup. The experiments were
performed on t2.nano and t2.micro instances
with a single core processes and 500MB and
1GB RAM, respectively. A Transformation
Process ran on an EC2 instance, perform-
ing both switching and resetting of instances
throughout the misery digraph. A request em-
ulation tool was developed to send a new re-
quest to the entry point every few seconds
awaiting the responses. When a response was
received within a timeout window, the request
will be considered a success, otherwise it will
be considered a failure. Recall that d refers
to the number of layers in the Misery Digraph
100 200 300 400 500 600 700
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Small
Large
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35
15
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Comparison of performance in three cloud-based networks
Processed
Failed
Fig. 7. An overview of the results of the ex-
periments with a normal cloud, a small misery
digraph with four layers, and a larger misery
digraph with five layers.
Cloud, and k refers to the number of children
for each instance in misery digraph network.
Let j be the duration of an experiment, r the
frequency of the Misery Process (the number
of times the misery digraph changes), and u is
the waiting time for a response.
The results of the experiments are depicted
in Figure 7. Processed requests capture the
number of requests processed by the web ap-
plication during the course of an experiment.
The failed requests captures the number of re-
quests that could not be processed within the
same period. The y-axis values refer to the
type of network that was used in the test (cloud
with a small misery digraph, cloud with a large
misery digraph, normal cloud with no misery
digraph).
A normal cloud is one that does not include a
misery digraph. We conducted an experiment
on a normal network which had three EC2 in-
stances. The first one was an entry point which
works as a reverse proxy for the second in-
stance which ran Apache HTTPd and a tiny
PHP page that sent a query to the third in-
stance which contains a MySQL server. The
entry point instance ran Apache HTTPd with
mod proxy extension to behave as a reverse
proxy server.
All of them were t2.nano but the database
server was t2.micro. Each instance had 8GB
of storage. The operating system images that
were used for the instances were based on
Amazon Linux AMI 64-bit. In this experiment
d = 0 and k = 0 since it was a normal net-
work and not a misery digraph cloud, j = 10
minutes, r = 100 seconds and u = 1 seconds.
The goal was to find the number of requests
that normal network could handle and compare
those numbers with networks that includes a
Misery Digraph. Our normal cloud could han-
dle an average of 716.5 requests with a maxi-
mum of 15 failed requests.
A Misery Digraph Cloud extends the archi-
tecture of the normal cloud by including a tree
of redundant virtual machines that mediate the
entry point and the target. We created two
Misery Digraph Clouds, one with d = 3, and
one with d = 4, with the branching param-
eter k = 2. We prepared two different op-
erating system images to be used in the in-
stances pool. The first one contained the Mis-
ery Multicaster based on Amazon Linux AMI,
The second one contained the RS that imple-
mented the Apache HTTPd and a PHP script
that connected to a database for testing using a
Ubuntu Server 16.04. Another image was built
based on Amazon Linux AMI, which was used
for the Network Constructor that created the
Misery Digraph Cloud, which contained the
Polling Server and the target database server
(with a MySQL engine).
In both experiments, j = 10 minutes, r =
100 seconds and u = 1.5 seconds. As one
can see, the average of successful requests
with d = 3 was 675.8, with a performance
penalty of 40.7 requests compared to the nor-
mal cloud. When the misery digraph was cre-
ated using d = 4, the average of successful
requests was 642 with a performance penalty
of 74.5 requests from the normal network. The
most failures were with the executions that per-
formed the Misery Process on the second layer
instances.
5. Discussion
Our architecture demonstrates techniques for
realizing misery digraphs in cloud-based vir-
tual networks running conventional web appli-
cations. Here, we consider both the security
and the scalability issues and provide an anal-
ysis and a direction of future work.
The security of the presented architecture
depends entirely on the security promises of
misery digraphs. Attackers are assumed to be
remote. The requests are assumed to be first at-
tack attempts to exploit the target machines to
prepare for malicious data requests to follow
through the network. Our architecture does
not distinguish between the two types of at-
tack request and delays both types regardless
of intents. However, attackers may attempt
to mimic a normal request, taking advantage
of the fair treatment of requests by misery di-
graphs as they travel through the network. This
attack can be beneficial only when the ini-
tial attacking requests succeed in exploiting
machines in the very first layer of misery di-
graphs. Consequently, the attacker must esca-
late privileges to initiate new requests from an
exploited machine. This attempt can be pre-
vented by modifying the web application and
banning it from initiating new requests, unless
the requests come from a remote and registered
client.
A second possibility of attack is the threat
from insiders, which are those users within the
organization that have access to a subset of
nodes in the expanded cloud-based virtual net-
work with an enabled misery digraph. Given
enough nodes en route to the target, the in-
sider may attempt to create malicious requests
or launch an attack on other machines. This is
a vulnerability in the existing architecture and
requires mitigation, which is left for a future
work.
The scalability of the architecture depends
on a fast processing and cache management
of misery digraphs. As demonstrated in our
work, given current web server performances,
one can create highly scalable misery digraphs
with low error rates. One may suggest cre-
ating even larger misery digraphs for better
mitigation of the attack. However, as demon-
strated in [2], a misery digraph with d = 4 with
fast switching is confusing enough for attack-
ers. It remains a question whether misery di-
graphs are effective against distributed attacks,
another topic for future investigation.
6. Conclusion
Prior to this work, the practical and perfor-
mance feasibility of misery digraphs were not
systematically explored. This research con-
tributes to the idea of misery digraphs by pre-
senting an efficient and high throughput archi-
tecture that can be used in practice. The main
constraints of this work were to use existing
prominent cloud technologies and high request
processing performance, which were achieved.
In the future, this work will be expanded to ex-
plore the idea of adaptive changes to the under-
lying misery digraph as a real time response to
detected attack incidents.
. References
[1] S. Achleitner, T. La Porta, P. McDaniel,
S. Sugrim, S. V. Krishnamurthy, and
R. Chadha. Cyber deception: Virtual
networks to defend insider reconnais-
sance. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM
CCS International Workshop on Manag-
ing Insider Security Threats, MIST ’16,
pages 57–68, New York, NY, USA, 2016.
ACM.
[2] H. M. J. Almohri, L. T. Watson, and
D. Evans. Misery digraphs: Delaying in-
trusion attacks in obscure clouds. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 13(6):1361–1375, 06 2018.
[3] H. M. J. Almohri, L. T. Watson, D. Yao,
and X. Ou. Security optimization of dy-
namic networks with probabilistic graph
modeling and linear programming. IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, 13(4):474–487, 07 2016.
[4] J. S. Alowibdi, U. A. Buy, P. S. Yu, and
L. Stenneth. Detecting deception in on-
line social networks. In Proceedings of
the 2014 IEEE/ACM International Con-
ference on Advances in Social Networks
Analysis and Mining, ASONAM ’14,
pages 383–390, Piscataway, NJ, USA,
2014. IEEE Press.
[5] L. Alt, R. Beverly, and A. Dainotti. Un-
covering network tarpits with degreaser.
In Proceedings of the 30th Annual Com-
puter Security Applications Conference,
ACSAC ’14, pages 156–165, New York,
NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[6] G. Badishi, A. Herzberg, and I. Kei-
dar. Keeping denial-of-service attack-
ers in the dark. IEEE Transactions
on Dependable and Secure Computing,
4(3):191–204, 07 2007.
[7] B. M. Bowen, V. P. Kemerlis, P. Prabhu,
A. D. Keromytis, and S. J. Stolfo. Au-
tomating the injection of believable de-
coys to detect snooping. In Proceedings
of the Third ACM Conference on Wireless
Network Security, WiSec ’10, pages 81–
86, New York, NY, USA, 2010. ACM.
[8] D. Evans, A. Nguyen-Tuong, and
J. Knight. Effectiveness of Moving Target
Defenses, pages 29–48. Springer New
York, New York, NY, 2011.
[9] X. Han, N. Kheir, and D. Balzarotti.
Evaluation of deception-based web at-
tacks detection. In Proceedings of the
2017 Workshop on Moving Target De-
fense, MTD ’17, pages 65–73, New York,
NY, USA, 2017. ACM.
[10] J. B. Hong and D. S. Kim. Assessing the
effectiveness of moving target defenses
using security models. IEEE Transac-
tions on Dependable and Secure Com-
puting, 13(2):163–177, 03 2016.
[11] J. H. Jafarian, E. Al-Shaer, and Q. Duan.
Openflow random host mutation: Trans-
parent moving target defense using soft-
ware defined networking. In Proceed-
ings of the First Workshop on Hot Topics
in Software Defined Networks, HotSDN
’12, pages 127–132, New York, NY,
USA, 2012. ACM.
[12] Q. Jia, K. Sun, and A. Stavrou. MOTAG:
Moving target defense against internet
denial of service attacks. In 2013 22nd
International Conference on Computer
Communication and Networks, pages 1–
9, 07 2013.
[13] Q. Jia, H. Wang, D. Fleck, F. Li,
A. Stavrou, and W. Powell. Catch me
if you can: A cloud-enabled DDoS de-
fense. In 2014 44th Annual IEEE/IFIP
International Conference on Dependable
Systems and Networks, pages 264–275,
06 2014.
[14] A. D. Keromytis, V. Misra, and
D. Rubenstein. SOS: an architecture for
mitigating DDoS attacks. IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications,
22(1):176–188, 01 2004.
[15] P. P. C. Lee, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein.
Distributed algorithms for secure multi-
path routing in attack-resistant networks.
IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., 15(6):1490–
1501, Dec. 2007.
[16] V. Lisy´, R. Zivan, K. Sycara, and
M. Peˇchoucˇek. Deception in networks of
mobile sensing agents. In Proceedings
of the 9th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Sys-
tems, AAMAS ’10, pages 1031–1038,
Richland, SC, 2010. International Foun-
dation for Autonomous Agents and Mul-
tiagent Systems.
[17] E. Miehling, M. Rasouli, and D. Teneket-
zis. Optimal defense policies for par-
tially observable spreading processes on
bayesian attack graphs. In Proceedings
of the Second ACM Workshop on Moving
Target Defense, MTD ’15, pages 67–76,
New York, NY, USA, 2015. ACM.
[18] W. G. Morein, A. Stavrou, D. L.
Cook, A. D. Keromytis, V. Misra, and
D. Rubenstein. Using graphic turing tests
to counter automated ddos attacks against
web servers. In Proceedings of the 10th
ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, CCS ’03, pages 8–
19, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM.
[19] P. Pal, N. Soule, N. Lageman, S. S. Clark,
M. Carvalho, A. Granados, and A. Alves.
Adaptive resource management enabling
deception (armed). In Proceedings of the
12th International Conference on Avail-
ability, Reliability and Security, ARES
’17, pages 52:1–52:8, New York, NY,
USA, 2017. ACM.
[20] T. Shu, M. Krunz, and S. Liu. Se-
cure data collection in wireless sensor
networks using randomized dispersive
routes. IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, 9(7):941–954, 07 2010.
[21] L. Spitzner. The honeynet project: Trap-
ping the hackers. IEEE Security and Pri-
vacy, 1(2):15–23, Mar. 2003.
[22] A. Stavrou, A. D. Keromytis, J. Nieh,
V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein. MOVE: an
end-to-end solution to network denial of
service. In Proceedings of the Network
and Distributed System Security Sympo-
sium, NDSS 2005, San Diego, California,
USA, 2005.
[23] M. P. Stoecklin, J. Zhang, F. Araujo, and
T. Taylor. Dressed up: Baiting attack-
ers through endpoint service projection.
In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Inter-
national Workshop on Security in Soft-
ware Defined Networks & Network Func-
tion Virtualization, SDN-NFV Sec’18,
pages 23–28, New York, NY, USA, 2018.
ACM.
